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1. Introduction
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 essay	 is	 to	make	 a	 comparison	 among	 the	most	 recent	
Italian	historiographical	views	regarding	the	Marshall	plan	and	more	in	general	
the	Reconstruction	period,	keeping	as	chronological	boundary	the	early	Fifties.	
The	present	essay	attempts	to	focus	on	the	principal	issues	historians	have	put	
under	analysis,	by	highlighting	similarities	and	differences	to	show	unresolved	
trends	 in	 research.	A	section	 follows	which	 is	devoted	 to	 the	description	of	
the	economic	 features	of	 the	ERP	 (European	Recovery	Plan)	 in	 Italy	 in	 the	
broadest	 context	 of	 the	Reconstruction	process	 involving	 the	 economic	 and	
social	fabric.	Moreover,	a	description	of	the	related	modes	of	employment	and	
the	Italian	economic	sectors	involved	in	the	plan	along	with	figures	is	provided	
in	the	following	section.	Finally,	a	tentative	description	of	the	actual	effects	of	
the	ERP	on	the	economy	is	made	and	some	conclusions	are	drawn.
The	Italian	historiographical	debate	regarding	the	post-war	Reconstruction	
and	 the	 economic	 policies	 has	 undergone	 a	 substantial	 shift	 during	 the	 last	
fifteen	years,	which	mainly	 consists	 in	 the	 increasing	 success	 of	 a	 line	 that	
breaks	with	the	traditional	manichean	contrast	between	the	idea	of	intervention	
of	 the	 State	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 Liberalism.	 The	 fundamental	 contribution	 in	
this	 direction	 comes	 from	 the	 studies	 of	 the	 economist	Fabrizio	Barca	who	
analyses	the	shaping	process	of	Italian	capitalism	in	the	period	1945-1962/63	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	 institutional	 assets,	 public	Administration’s	modus 
operandi,	 and	 the	 job,	 products	 and	 capitals	markets.	 In	Barca’s	 analysis	 a	
central	 role	 is	played	by	 the	concept	of	«extraordinary» compromise	which	
qualifies	 the	 developing	 model	 of	 capitalism	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
Reconstruction	 and	 in	 which	 both	 terms	 (extraordinary	 and	 compromise)	
assume	specific	meanings.	The	innovative	basic	feature	of	this	interpretation	
lays	in	the	multiplicity	of	subjects	involved	in	this	compromise	with	respect	
to	the	traditional	lecture	that	juxtaposed	liberalists	and	State	interventionists.	
The	 main	 subjects	 of	 this	 emerging	 model	 of	 capitalism	 are,	 according	 to	
Barca,	the	“Autonomous	Public	Boards”:	they	are	public	institutions	which	are	
autonomous	and	separated	from	the	“ordinary”	public	administration.	These	
boards	are	marked	by	a	private-law	organization,	a	high	quality	management	
and	are	in	charge	of	allocation	and	mobilization	of	savings	as	well	as	of	the	
responsibility	of	 strategic	 address	 in	 economic	 choices.	 It	 is	 important	 here	
to	 underline	 the	 continuity	 of	 this	model	with	 respect	 to	 the	 fascist	 period.	
The	Autonomous	Public	Boards	are	the	only	responsible	for	the	detection	of	
crucial	priorities	in	Italian	economic	development	and	also	for	the	collection	
and	distribution	of	ERP	aids	since	the	end	of	1944.	Barca	localizes	at	the	end	
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of	1949	and	during	1950	what	he	calls	 a	«correction	of	 conduct»	 in	 Italian	
economic	 policies	 because	 of	 bad	 employment	 levels	 and	 growing	 social	
unrest	above	all	in	the	South	(the	so	called	“Mezzogiorno”).	This	«correction»	
is	marked	by	the	speeding	up	of	public	intervention	in	the	economy.	From	this	
specific	point	of	view,	an	Autonomous	Public	Board	is	created	once	again	to	
compensate	the	lack	of	State	intervention:	this	board	is	the	Casmez	(“Cassa	per	
il	Mezzogiorno”)	(D’Antone	1997)	which	has	the	target	of	balancing	Southern	
Italy	backwardness	also	using	ERP	aids	and	World	Bank	loans	(Barca	1997:	
3-115).
The	historian	Rolf	Petri	faces	the	Italian	Reconstruction	question	in	terms	of	
the	triumph	of	an	industrialization	strategy	that	he	refers	to	as	«neomercantilist»,	
in	the	medium	term	between	the	‘30s	and	the	‘60s.	A	breakthrough	in	economic	
policies	is	pointed	out	in	1947,	which,	following	Luigi	Einaudi’s	guidelines,	
was	devoted	 to	bailing	out	 the	 Italian	 currency	 from	a	hyperbolic	 inflation.	
At	that	 time	Einaudi	was	governor	of	the	Bank	of	Italy.	Petri	faces	then	the	
question	 of	 the	 possible	 causes	 of	 the	 Communists’	 behaviour	 during	 the	
period	they	were	in	the	government.	They	did	not	support	a	technocratic	line	
of	the	economic	planning	at	all	and	this	has	to	be	explained	considering	the	
actual	Communists’	priorities.	Under	 these	circumstances,	 the	 launch	of	 the	
Marshall	plan	played	a	key-role	in	the	emersion	of	State-planning	lines	in	the	
whole	 context	of	 the	decision	making	process	 regarding	economic	policies.	
These	lines	are	represented	by	the	IRI’s	Study	Institute	led	by	the	economist	
Pasquale	Saraceno	 (IRI,	 Istituto	 per	 la	Ricostruzione	 Industriale).	A	 second	
crucial	moment	 is	pointed	out	by	Petri	 in	 the	economic	consumption	boom	
provoked	by	the	Korean	war.	This	was	represented	by	the	correction	of	line	in	
economic	policies	forced	by	some	critical	American	judgements	in	the	Country	
study	and	at	the	same	time	by	the	simultaneous	socio-political	developments	in	
Italy	(Petri	1997:	313-419).
Federico	Romero	focuses	his	attention	on	the	United	States’	influence	in	the	
birth	and	consolidation	of	republican	Italy	and	on	its	post-war	economic	policies.	
Washington’s	aims	concerning	the	Italian	economic	developments	undergo	a	
radical	change	during	the	first	months	of	the	1946	following	the	irreversible	
anti-Soviet	breaking	off.	Washington’s	policy-makers’	 inescapable	goals	are	
now	the	stabilization	of	the	lira	«even	at	the	expense	of	the	population»	and	the	
Reconstruction	take	off.	Romero	underlines	that	ERP	political	consequences	
in	Italy	have	been	much	more	relevant	than	its	mere	economic	effects	since	
they	enabled	Christian	democratic	party	(DC,	Democrazia	Cristiana)	to	face	
key	political	 elections	on	18th	April	 1948	with	 a	vital	 survival	margin	 in	 a	
socially	torn	country,	also	subject	to	a	criticized	deflationary	measure.	During	
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1949	 a	 partial	 change	 in	 Italian	 economic	 policies	 takes	 place	 but	 it	 is	 not	
to	 be	 intended	 in	 a	Keynesian	 direction	 as	 desired	 by	 the	 ECA	 (Economic	
Cooperation	 Administration)	 mission.	 In	 fact,	 these	 measures	 were	 meant	
to	 provide	 capitals	 to	 industries	 in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 foster	 a	 new	 cycle	 of	
industrialization.	 According	 to	 Romero	 Marshall	 plan	 success	 in	 Italy	 is	
indisputable	 under	 the	 strategic	 profile.	 Although	 the	 plan	 application	 did	
not	comply	with	the	social	philosophy	that	binds	growth	and	consensus	in	a	
Keynesian	way,	it	enabled	one	of	the	most	vulnerable	countries	of	the	Western	
block	to	remain	within	it	(Romero	1994:	231-289).
The	historian	of	Economics	Giulio	Sapelli	views	Marshall	plan	function	in	
Italy	in	terms	of	an	«exchange»	between	Italian	ruling	class	and	United	States:	
a	strong	control	with	anticommunist	function	of	Italy	was	traded	with	a	consent	
for	economic	policies	to	deviate	from	Keynesian	lines	(i.e.	opening	towards	
external	markets	through	exportations	and	internal	market	widening).	Starting	
from	 February	 1947,	 after	 the	 communist	 exclusion	 from	 the	 government,	
Italian	 policy-makers	 launch	 a	 strong	 deflationary	 line	 and	 a	 tightening	 of	
credit	in	order	to	«save	the	lira»,	by	these	means	reassuring	the	middle	class	
and	speculators	 that	capitals	could	be	“repatriated”	with	the	consequence	of	
increasing	monetary	 stocks.	 Side	 effects	 of	 this	 policy	were	 a	 crash	 in	 the	
Stock	Exchange,	a	vertical	increase	of	unemployment	and	the	interruption	of	
productive	Reconstruction.	However,	Italian	ruling	class	targets	were	monetary	
stabilization	as	well	as	the	middle-class	social	block	stability	in	order	to	give	
centrality	and	political	legitimacy	to	those	who	saw	in	Bretton	Woods	and	in	
the	ERP	more	than	a	simple	economic	instrument	(Sapelli	1997).
2. The first phase of the reconstruction process (1943-1947)
During	the	last	phases	of	World	War	II,	Allied	Military	Government	(AMG)	
main	tasks	in	Italy	did	not	provide	for	economic	measures	but	consisted	in	the	
progressive	restitution	of	local	government	control	to	Italian	authorities	placed	
underneath	 supervision	 by	 the	Allied	Control	Commission	 (ACC)	 (Romero	
1994:	236-237).
Nevertheless,	 this	 strategy of indirect control	 had	 really	 negative	
consequences	 on	 the	 reorganization	 of	 Public	 Administration	 and	 on	 the	
economic	recovery	and	ended	in	the	quick	widespread	of	famine,	black	market	
and	inflation,	the	last	worsened	by	large	issue	of	allied	banknotes	necessary	for	
AMG	activity	(Romero	1994:	237).
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General	Badoglio’s	governments	(July	‘43	–	June	‘44)	conflict	with	antifascist	
parties	 together	 with	 Anglo-american	 paralysis	 provoked	 by	 internal	
disagreements	and	little	attention	to	a	war	theatre	judged	secondary,	led	in	the	
end	to	the	failure	of	the	indirect control strategy	(Romero	1994:	237).
In	this	context	it	is	relevant	to	describe	the	overall	process	at	the	base	of	the	
inflationary	growth	because	the	need	of	curbing	it	would	lead	to	the	so	called	
«deflationary	turning	point»	carried	out	by	Luigi	Einaudi,	governor	of	Bank	of	
Italy	in	1947.
In	 the	 two-year	 period,	 1943-45,	 inflation	 developed	mainly	 because	 of	
financing	methods	practiced	in	 the	 two	occupied	areas	of	 the	country.	From	
31	August	 1943	 until	 30	April	 1945,	 total	 net	money	 circulation	 increased	
from	115.7	 to	360.7	billion	 liras	with	an	 increase	of	65%	deriving	from	the	
Northern	 area	 of	German	 occupation	 and	 of	 31%	 provoked	 by	 the	 already	
mentioned	 allied	military	 notes	 («amliras»)	 issued	 to	 some	 degree	 without	
financial	 backing.	AMG	 decision	 to	 fix	 the	 exchange	 rate	 at	 one	 dollar	 to	
100	lira	(against	19	pre-war	lira	exchange)	worsened	inflation	by	increasing	
troop’s	purchasing	power	beyond	measure	and	then	exerting	pressure	on	price	
level.	This	was,	in	short,	the	cause	of	an	inflationary	spiral	that,	except	for	a	
momentary	lull	in	1946,	would	have	been	stopped	during	the	second	half	of	
1947	through	monetary	squeeze	(Petri	1997:	325-326).
The	measure	of	exchanging	devalued	currency	with	a	“heavier”	one	could	
have	reduced	circulating	monetary	mass	and	debt	but	neither	socialist	Ferruccio	
Parri‘s	 government	 (June	 –	 November	 ‘45)	 nor	 first	 christian-democrat	
government	 led	by	Alcide	De	Gasperi	 (December	 ‘45	–	 July	 ‘46)	 took	 that	
measure.	Furthermore,	widespread	opposition	to	this	option	into	the	Bank	of	
Italy	made	it	fade	once	and	for	all	(Petri	1997:	325-326).
First	 signs	 of	 a	Washington	 closer	 involvement	 in	 the	 process	 of	 Italian	
reconstruction	were	evident	on	the	summer	of	1944,	but	they	consisted	basically	
in	generic	suggestions	towards	policies	devoted	to	achieve	economic	welfare	
on	the	road	of	self-determination	in	building	a	stable	democratic	system.	This	
policy,	 known	 as	 democratic recovery policy	 contributed,	 however,	 to	 the	
opening	of	a	dialogue	between	AMG	and	the	newborn	and	sole	 trade	union	
(CGIL,	Confederazione	Generale	Italiana	del	Lavoro),	dialogue	that	enabled,	
in	Northern	 Italy,	 to	 refer	 to	an	authoritative	and	 representative	 interlocutor	
with	 which	 to	 defuse	 pressures	 towards	 social	 unrest	 and	 disintegration.	
Furthermore,	 allied	 authorities’	desire	 for	dialogue	contributed	 to	 resistance	
disarmament	and	to	transference	of	power	to	the	Government	in	Rome	without	
resorting	to	force	(Romero	1994:	239-240).
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United	 States	 policy	 makers	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 work	 out	 a	 clear	 line	 of	
conduct	to	face	reconstruction	difficulties	after	the	end	of	conflict	and	AMG	
demobilisation.	Italy	was	emerging	from	the	war	with	its	economic	fabric	in	
a	 tricky	 situation.	 Industry	 did	 not	 undergo	 severe	 damages	 during	 conflict	
which	 was	 fought	 mainly	 in	 the	 South	 where	 the	 core-base	 of	 industrial	
assets	was	not	located.	It	was	concentrated	instead	in	the	so-called	“industrial	
triangle”	 Milano-Torino-Genova	 with	 branches	 in	 Emilia	 Romagna	 and	
Veneto.	In	particular,	mechanical	engineering	and	electric	industry,	following	
the	 increase	 in	productivity	during	 the	war,	were	able	 to	start	activity	again	
at	 a	 level	 exceeding	 approximately	 30%	 of	 the	 pre-war	 capacity.	 The	 iron	
and	steel	industry	had	to	recover	war	damages	in	the	industrial	complexes	of	
Piombino	and	Bagnoli	and	the	German	dismantling	of	Cornigliano	complex	
near	Genova.	The	textile	industry	did	not	undergo	any	remarkable	damage	and	
so	could	resume	production	at	full	rate.	
In	spite	of	this	situation,	looking	at	European	context	it	is	clear	the	delay	
in	development	of	Italian	industry	with	respect	to	France	and	Germany	either	
in	 terms	of	occupation	or,	and	above	all,	 in	 terms	of	product.	The	real	 limit	
for	Italian	economy	was	the	raw	materials	narrowing,	coal	principally,	as	well	
as	infrastructure	and	lines	of	communication	situation.	More	than	80%	of	the	
merchant	navy	was	destroyed,	around	40%	of	railway	tracks	and	bridges	were	
out	of	order	and	building	assets	underwent	serious	damages	(Barca	1997:	4)	
(Petri	1997:	316).	
The	 fear	 of	 a	 possible	 communist	 advancement	 in	 the	 country	 provoked	
by	economic	and	social	sufferings,	led	admiral	Ellery	Stone,	leader	of	ACC,	
to	 ask	Washington	 for	 a	 huge	 shipment	 of	 economic	 aids	 supported	 by	 the	
Italian	embassy	in	the	US.	On	10	July	1945,	undersecretary	to	Foreign	Affairs	
William	 Clayton	 informed	 the	 embassy	 in	 Rome	 to	 encourage	 the	 Italian	
government	to	dismantle	bilateral	commercial	agreements	and	trade	barriers	in	
order	to	open	at	a	global	economy	without	obstacles.	The	principal	difficulties	
in	carrying	out	those	guidelines	were	to	be	found	mainly	in	the	unwillingness	
of	the	US	during	1945	to	send	aid,	food	and	raw	material	to	Italy	and	at	the	
same	time	in	finding	a	clear	and	strong	political	counterpart	to	open	a	dialogue	
on	reconstruction	(Romero	1994:	239-240).
In	the	period	between	autumn	1945	and	the	end	of	1946	Washington	leaders’	
attention	towards	Italian	issues	was	so	low	that	the	US	ambassador	in	Rome	
had	not	been	present	for	several	months.	However,	new	signs	of	involvement	
about	democratic	stabilization	of	the	country	could	be	seen	with	the	coming	
of	the	first	De	Gasperi‘s	government	(December	‘45).	The	christian-democrat	
leader	firmly	 took	side	with	American	aid	 to	push	reconstruction	and	on	14	
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February	1946	Italian	government	asked	Export-Import	Bank	for	a	money	loan	
of	$	940	million.	It	was	an	amount	that	strongly	overvalued	Italian	monetary	
need	thus	arousing	suspicion.	Furthermore	Treasury	Department	put	off	any	
decision	 regarding	 loans	 to	 Italy	 to	 the	definition	of	war	 reparation	and	 the	
signing	of	the	peace	treaty	(Romero	1994:	241-242).
On	a	strictly	economic	level,	 the	main	feature	in	1946	was	the	launch	of	
UNRRA	aid	program	(United	Nations	Relief	and	Rehabilitation	Administration)	
for	 Italy.	 It	was	managed	by	 a	United	Nation	mission	 that	 placed	 at	 Italy’s	
disposal	about	$	450	million	consisting	of	 foods,	 fuel	and	medicines	whose	
sale	on	the	Italian	market	brought	to	the	formation	of	the	«lira	fund»	that	had	
to	be	used	 to	 start	 specific	projects	 of	 reconstruction,	 subjected	 to	UNRRA	
mission	agreement.	UNRRA	mission	staff	was	mainly	composed	by	American	
officials	supporting	a	Keynesian	employment	of	public	spending	in	order	 to	
increase	domestic	consumption	and	investment.	The	amount	of	UNRRA	aid	
was	remarkable	being	equal	to	45%	of	estimated	imports	for	all	of	1946	and	to	
4.2%	of	Gross	national	product	(GNP)	(Romero	1994:	241-242).
Italian	 historiographical	 debate	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 UNRRA	 aid	
under	the	point	of	view	of	primary	consumption	and	the	balance	of	payment.	
Nevertheless	 it	 underlined	 that	 in	 a	 context	 of	 public	 deficit	 and	monetary	
crisis	 it	was	unrealistic	UNRRA	Keynesian	option	also	considering	the	lack	
of	a	well-established	political	interlocutor	able	to	ensure	a	coherent	economic	
planning.	Italian	minister	of	Treasury	Epicarmo	Corbino	was	a	keen	opponent	
to	public	spending	widening	and	he	was	often	 in	conflict	with	mission	staff	
thus	 thwarting	any	potential	Keynesian	 influence	of	UN	aid	 (Romero	1994:	
243).
A	recent	study	focuses	UNRRA	aid	meaning	and	function	 in	 Italy	 in	 the	
broader	context	of	ERP	aid	and	in	the	interpretation	of	their	absolute	need	in	
Italian	and	European	reconstruction.	In	order	to	reply	to	this	question	it	is	not	
possible	to	ignore	the	importance	and	effects	related	to	aid	programs	preceding	
ERP	such	as	UNRRA	but	also	the	so	called	Interim	Aid	(IA).	Interim	aid	was	
an	additional	aid	program	which	was	urged	by	Italian	and	French	governments	
on	September	1947	during	Washington	and	Paris	negotiations.	The	rationale,	
explained	by	Foreign	ministers	George	Bidault	and	Carlo	Sforza,	was	the	result	
of	respective	trade	gap	crisis	which	would	not	enable	to	buy	commodities	such	
as	wheat	and	coal.	Sforza	and	Bidault	argued	that	in	a	possible	context	of	food	
scarcity	it	was	a	realistic	communist-led	popular	revolt	(Spagnolo	2001:	92-
97).
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In	fact,	the	true	reason	behind	Italy’s	direct	demand	to	Robert	Lovett,	Marshall’s	
deputy,	was	not	 food	worries	but	 the	desire	 to	restore	 industrial	growth	and	
more	 generally	 to	 support	 the	 economy	 as	 a	 whole.	 This	 is	 quite	 clear	 in	
the	 correspondence	 between	 the	 Italian	 ambassador	 in	Washington	Alberto	
Tarchiani	and	Lovett	in	which	Italian	diplomat	made	a	long	list	of	industrial	raw	
materials	for	$	115.2	million,	more	than	60%	on	overall	Italian	demand.	The	
government	of	Rome	did	not	have	at	its	disposal	enough	dollars	to	pay	imports	
beyond	 October	 1947,	 imports	 that	 were	 requested	 by	 industrial	 demand.	
Therefore	Interim	Aid’s	principal	goal	was	to	widen	operating	margins	for	the	
Central	 Bank	 letting	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 government	 breathe	 by	 avoiding	
the	difficult	choice	between	an	unpopular	cut	on	foodstuff	and	a	slowdown	in	
industrial	production.	Therefore	IA’s	political	role	was	decisive	in	enabling	the	
start	of	a	political	strategy	otherwise	impossible.	Donato	Menichella,	general	
director	of	the	Bank	of	Italy	underlined	it	clearly,	
“Stabilization	 was	 made	 possible	 by	 Interim	 aid.	 Communists	 and	 political	 parties	
linked	to	them	were	strong.	Interim	aid	and	Marshall	plan	perspective	made	it	possible	
to	 reach	price	stability	and,	consequently,	 trust	 in	currency.	These	conditions	helped	
provoking	 the	heaviest	communist	defeat	after	 the	end	of	 the	war”	 (Spagnolo	2001:	
93-97).
Menichella	referred	to	communist	electoral	defeat	on	18	April	1948	thus	bringing	
our	analysis	on	the	study	of	the	relationships	between	economic	policies	and	
internal	and	international	political	developments.	The	period	between	summer	
1946	and	late	spring	1947	is	marked	by	decisive	developments	in	the	process	
of	Italian	reconstruction	on	which	several	Italian	and	international	factors	were	
entangled.	 It	 is	 important	here	 to	show	in	advance	a	meaningful	conclusion	
shared	by	most	of	leading	Italian	scholars	i.e.	in	the	whole	process	of	economic	
policy	 definition	 during	 reconstruction	 Italian	 policy	 makers	 enjoyed	 wide	
margins	of	freedom	and	independence	from	external	pressures	and	specifically	
American	ones	(Sapelli	1997:	2).	
In	more	 general	 terms,	 the	 reconstruction	 process	was	 part	 of	 the	wider	
shaping	 scheme	of	 Italian	 capitalism	after	Second	World	War.	This	 process	
took	 the	 shape	 of	 an	 «extraordinary compromise»:	 compromise	 because	
it	was	 the	 result	 of	mediation	 among	very	 different	 ideas	 and	 interests	 that	
could	find	a	point	of	agreement	in	one	renounce	and	one	choice.	The	former	
consisted	in	not	creating	the	«rules	of	the	game»	for	the	ordinary	functioning	
of	 job,	 capitals	 and	goods	markets	 as	well	 as	 of	 the	Public	Administration.	
The	choice,	in	continuity	with	Fascist	period,	consisted	in	the	decision	to	face	
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development	matters	through	the	extraordinary	means	of	Autonomous Public 
Boards.	Under	this	perspective	the	meaning	of	«compromise»	does	not	refer	to	
the	intermediate	nature	of	its	own	features	rather	it	refers	to	their	emergence,	in	
each	specific	case,	thanks	to	the	convergence	or	crossed	vetoes	of	the	involved	
subjects	(Barca	1997:	11-23).1
It	is	possible	to	point	out	from	this	general	parenthesis	an	element	useful	
for	our	discussion	i.e.	Autonomous Public Boards	key-role	in	the	drawing	of	
a	 general	 plan	 for	 Italian	 industrial	 development,	mainly	 the	Bank	 of	 Italy	
and	IRI	(Istituto	per	la	Ricostruzione	Industriale).	This	plan	was	the	so	called	
«Saraceno	plan»	that	was	worked	out	on	September	1947	by	the	Centre	for	
technical-economic	studies	inside	IRI	led	by	Pasquale	Saraceno.	It	was	a	long-	
term	plan	(1948-52)	that,	upgraded,	was	submitted	to	OEEC	(Organization	for	
European	Economic	Cooperation)	by	minister	of	Industry	Roberto	Tremelloni	
in	summer	1948	in	order	to	support	Italy’s	claim	to	take	part	in	the	Marshall	
plan.	An	evident	sign	of	change	in	American	perspective	regarding	economic	
policies	 to	 support	 Italy	was	 clear	 since	 summer	 ‘46.	The	 rationale	 of	 this	
reappraisal	lies	both	in	the	growing	strains	inside	Italian	economy	and	in	the	
social	and	political	crisis	 that	 led	 to	 the	clash	between	 the	communist	party	
and	minister	of	Treasury	Corbino	who	submitted	his	resignation.	Under	those	
circumstances,	the	US	embassy	in	Rome	as	well	as	the	UNRRA	staff	agreed	
that	principal	 tasks	were	now	the	rescue	of	 the	 lira	and	 the	open	clash	with	
PCI.	However,	 times	and	 forms	of	 reconstruction	were	not	compatible	with	
contradictory	and	ineffective	policy	of	Italian	government	composed	both	by	
the	Left	and	the	liberals	(Romero	1994:	244).
The	 Italian	 prime	 minister’s	 visit	 to	 Washington	 (5-14	 January	 1947)	
assumed	 a	 strong	 political	 meaning	 but	 brought	 scarce	 economic	 results	
showing,	 however,	 a	 convergence	 between	 De	 Gasperi’s	 and	 Washington	
political	 interests.	The	difference	 regarded	once	 again	 times	 and	modes	not	
yet	 corresponding	because	of	 a	gap	 in	 the	 evolution	of	 Italian	 crisis	 and	of	
European	context	that	is	to	say	the	US	foreign	policy	horizon.	The	progressive	
approach	 between	 those	 two	 contexts	 was	 however	 nearer	 and	 nearer:	 on	
February	1947	the	Italian	government	signed	a	peace	treaty	and	the	following	
month	 signed	 Lateran	 treaty	 with	 the	 Vatican.	 Those	 two	 important	 goals	
1	 	 The	 interests	 involved	 in	 this	 «extraordinary	 compromise»	 are,	 according	 to	 Barca,	 the	
following:	 «nittian»	 option,	 radical	 liberalism,	 communist	 strategy,	 «social-christian»	 thought,	
diversified	industrial	interests,	Washington	option.
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closed,	 at	 the	 eye	of	 christian-democrats,	meaning	and	 institutional	need	of	
antifascist	alliance	in	the	government	and	at	the	same	time	they	pointed	out	
new	tasks	in	the	recovery	of	entrepreneurs	and	middle	class	trust.	In	order	to	
reach	those	goals	the	toppling	of	social	alliances	and	the	rift	with	the	Left	was	
necessary	(Romero	1994:	248).
The	most	recent	and	parallel	developments	in	international	relations	were	
pushing	towards	that	direction:	on	12	March	1947	the	Truman	doctrine	was	
announced	pointing	out	the	transition	to	the	age	of	Cold	War.	Italian	diplomacy	
immediately	proposed	 an	unrealistic	 comparison	between	 Italian	 and	Greek	
crisis	and	asked	 for	an	 immediate	huge	 loan	 to	US	ambassador	 in	Rome	 to	
stabilize	 the	country.	 In	spite	of	 this	call	 for	help,	ambassador	James	Dunn,	
while	 repeating	 American	 support	 and	 trust	 in	 De	 Gasperi,	 made	 it	 clear	
that	 a	 substantial	 involvement	would	 come	 only	 after	 a	 clear	 sign	 towards	
political	and	economic	stabilization.	The	expected	sign	in	Washington	came	
on	13	May	1947	with	 the	government	 crisis	 opened	by	De	Gasperi.	On	16	
and	 20	 May,	 Italian	 ambassador	 Tarchiani	 met	 several	 times	 in	 the	 State	
Department	 Marshall	 himself	 in	 order	 to	 support	 De	 Gasperi’s	 initiative	
receiving	assurances	from	Marshall	on	the	complete	support	to	De	Gasperi’s	
anti-communist	effort.	On	the	following	31	May,	De	Gasperi	launched	the	first	
one-party	Christian-democrat	 government	 including	 five	 liberals.	 Five	 days	
later,	Marshall	delivered	his	historical	speech	in	Harvard	with	which	the	United	
States	declared	their	desire	 to	provide	financial	support	for	an	extraordinary	
plan	for	European	governments.	De	Gasperi,	with	American	backing,	obtained	
political	credibility	and	economic	feasibility	to	carry	out	his	political	project	of	
gaining	the	trust	of	a	social	coalition	based	on	middle	class	and	entrepreneurs	
(Romero	1988:	371).	He	played	on	Italian	strategic	weakness	and	opened	a	
distinctive	strategy of dependence	on	the	United	States	to	consolidate	internal	
stability	of	«centrism»	(Romero	1994:	250-251).
Summer	1947	was	characterized	on	the	economic	level	by	a	high	inflation	
together	with	the	suspension	of	convertibility	with	sterling.	It	was	necessary	
to	take	severe	measures	against	inflation.	They	became	effective	with	the	so	
called	 «Einaudi	 line»	 (from	 the	 name	 of	 the	 then	 governor	 of	 the	Bank	 of	
Italy):	 it	consisted	in	a	monetary	squeeze	that	was	judged	necessary	also	by	
American	authorities	in	order	to	stabilize	currency	while	waiting	for	ERP	aid.	
Scholars’	 interpretation	 about	 Einaudi’s	 line	 is	 not	 unanimous.	 In	 the	 next	
section	we	will	make	a	comparison	between	the	most	recent	positions	taken	
by	historians.	
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3. The «Einaudi line»: features and interpretations
Luigi	Einaudi	 represented	 the	 real	novelty	 in	 the	DC	one-party	government	
being	at	the	same	time	governor	of	the	Bank	of	Italy,	minister	of	Budget	and	
deputy	prime	minister.	On	17	July	1947,	after	the	exclusion	of	the	Left	from	the	
government,	Bank	of	Italy’s	powers	were	strengthened	through	the	creation	of	
an	Interdepartmental	Board	for	Credit	and	Saving	(CICR)	and	by	the	attribution	
of	supervisory	functions	to	the	Central	Bank	itself.	Einaudi	refused	to	apply	
any	Keynesian	measure	leading	to	deficit spending	rather	aiming	to	saving	and	
private	investment	restocking	through	balance	readjustment	and	cutting	state	
subsidies	on	prices.	The	so-called	«Einaudi	line»,	a	severe	monetary	squeeze	
that	 aimed	 to	 restore	 trust	 in	 currency	and	 to	curb	 inflation,	 is	 synonymous	
with	capitalist	stabilization	in	traditional	historical	criticism.	Recently	a	new	
trend	 in	 studies	 put	 forward	 a	 different	 interpretation	 of	 «Einaudi	 line»	 by	
criticizing	the	idea	that	this	line	consisted	in	the	triumph	of	a	strict	liberalism.	
On	the	contrary	it	is	argued	that	the	gap	between	declared	principles	and	real	
outcomes:	free-market	economy	pursued	by	Einaudi	since	1947-48	was	placed	
in	the	end	under	State	“guardianship”	(Spagnolo	2001:	88).
Einaudi’s	steps	cannot	be	interpreted	either	as	a	turning	point	or	a	rift	point	
with	respect	to	the	previous	period	because	they	rather	represented	the	end	and	
not	the	beginning	of	a	phase	of	uncompromising	liberalistic	experimentation.	
The	 Economics	 historian	 Rolf	 Petri	 argues	 that	 the	 first	 two	 De	 Gasperi’s	
governments	were	characterized	by	an	economic	package	regarding	foreign-
exchange	market	and	domestic	market	of	a	clearly	liberalistic	direction.	The	
launch	 of	 „Reconstruction	 loan“	 on	October	 1946	 explained	with	 the	 need	
of	 improving	 the	 financial	 backing	 of	 huge	 public	 spending,	 resulted	 in	 an	
excessive	increase	of	money	disposable	for	credit	institutions	thus	worsening	
speculation	and	stockpiling	 rather	 than	productive	 investments	 (Petri	1997).	
The	principal	changes	obtained	by	the	«Einaudi	line»	are	three:	the	opening	
of	 a	 phase	marked	by	 economic	 stability	 preserved	by	monetary	orthodoxy	
guarantors	 (i.e.	 Bank	 of	 Italy);	 the	 strengthening	 of	 state-intervention	
expectations	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 new	political	 period	with	 the	 breaking	
with	the	Left	and	the	birth	of	«centrism».	The	launch	of	the	Marshall	plan	and	
the	political	triumph	in	the	April	‘48	elections	made	it	possible	for	this	new	
political	phase	to	come	true.	Essentially,	Petri	describes	the	«Einaudi	line»	as	a	
set	of	measures	coherent	with	an	address	of	«liberal protectionism»	rather	than	
as	a	pure	liberal	turning	point	(Petri	1997:	326-330).
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The	main	 reason	behind	 the	gap	between	declared	economic	principles	and	
political	practice	is	to	be	found	principally	in	the	development	of	negotiations	
connected	to	Marshall	plan.	The	relationships	between	the	plan	and	Einaudi’s	
measure	explain	why	the	latter	was	applied	in	two	phases.	In	the	first	phase,	
Einaudi	and	Donato	Menichella,	governor’s	right	hand	man	and	later	successor,	
aimed	at	the	creation	of	institutional	bases	to	curb	inflation	while	waiting	for	
the	arrival	of	ERP	aid.	They	worked	principally	to	curb	credit	for	companies	
and	to	the	new	division	of	power	in	the	economic	field:	the	government	(i.e.	
Christian-democratic	party)	was	responsible	for	the	control	on	credit	system	
through	 the	ministry	 of	Treasury	while	 the	Bank	 of	 Italy	was	 in	 charge	 of	
monetary	stability	through	the	newborn	CICR	(Spagnolo	2001:	88).
The	second	phase	of	the	measure	(22	August	–	late	September	‘47)	began	
after	 the	 sterling	 crisis	 and	 during	 the	 Paris	 conference	 thus	 starting	 the	
monetary	stabilization	through	devaluation	and	fixing	exchange	rate.	In	order	
to	approach	convertibility	with	US	currency,	government	devalued	currency	
from	225	to	350	lira	per	dollar	(as	compared	to	600	lira	in	the	parallel	banking	
market)	and	since	28	November	the	exchange	rate	was	brought	to	around	575	
lira	per	dollar.	Spiralling	prices	of	 imports	and	a	drop	in	export	prices	were	
the	immediate	effects	of	Einaudi’s	measure	(Spagnolo	2001:	89).	It	must	be	
underlined,	with	regards	to	export,	that	Einaudi’s	measure	consisted	also	in	a	
number	of	initiatives	taken	by	the	minister	of	Foreign	Trade	Cesare	Merzagora	
devoted	to	currency	devaluation	(in	a	European	context	characterized	by	the	
lack	 of	 currency	 convertibility	 and	 transferability	 including	 sterling)	 while	
other	countries	chose	to	overvalue	their	own	currencies.	Merzagora’s	choice	
aimed	to	massively	foster	exports	and	led	Italy	to	have	a	credit	balance	with	her	
European	commercial	partners,	which	was	a	significant	advantage	for	exporters	
but	not	as	much	for	the	State.	Indeed,	Italian	public	administration,	in	return	
for	the	departure	of	goods,	received	currency	not	convertible,	not	transferable	
(and	 overvalued)	 and	 then	 useless	 outside	 that	 very	 bilateral	 agreement.	
Government	 policy	 was	 characterized	 by	 monetary	 devaluation,	 bilateral	
trade,	support	to	firms	and	productive	sector,	according	to	Merzagora’s	slogan	
«we	have	been	able	to	aid	ourselves».	This	kind	of	policy	would	go	on	during	
1948	together	with	a	„cautious“	use	of	ERP	aid	(Gualtieri	1998:	859-863).	The	
need	to	restore	the	balance	of	payments	and	to	recover	public	spending	was	
largely	out	of	government	control	requiring	a	decrease	in	imports	and	a	growth	
in	exports.	Keynesian	theories	of	increasing	demand	through	public	spending	
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were	not	enforceable,	at	least	in	such	a	context.	Einaudi’s	economic	package	
lacked	any	program	for	industries	as	well	as	any	type	of	social	compensation	
for	wage-earners	thus	assuming	highly	conservative	features	(Spagnolo	2001:	
89-92).
In	 similar	 vein,	 Giulio	 Sapelli’s	 interpretation	 is	 clear:	 Einaudi’s	
designation	to	minister	of	Budget,	“a	ministerial	post	created	ad hoc	to	enable	
middle	class	and	speculators’	supporters	 leader	 to	 take	 the	 leadership	of	 the	
country’s	economic	policy	[..]”	(Sapelli	1997:	28),	was	the	sign	of	antifascist	
government	 coalition’s	 end.	 Consequences	 of	 Einaudi’s	 measures	 are	 the	
already	mentioned	drop	in	overall	demand,	the	following	drop	of	prices	and	
the	stop	of	inflationary	spiral	but	also	unemployment	increase	and	productive	
reconstruction	paralysis.	Political	tasks	of	this	economic	package	was	middle	
class	reassurance	about	saving	debasement	as	well	as	speculators	 that	could	
repatriate	their	capitals	contributing	to	the	increase	of	monetary	reserves.	Those	
reserves	could	therefore	add	to	ERP	fund,	the	latter	necessary	to	pay	imports.	
The	social	alliance	based	on	middle	class	and	on	which	the	government	were	
lying,	could	gain	confidence	and	at	the	same	time	monetary	stabilization	was	
obtained	(Spagnolo	2001:	88-92).
The	 clear	 christian-democrats	 election	 success	 on	 18	 April	 1948	 was	
influenced	 also	 by	 a	 massive	 propaganda	 campaign	 organized	 by	 the	 US	
with	anti-communist	 function	and	characterized	by	placing	 in	 the	middle	of	
the	 political	 struggle	 the	 imminent	 arrival	 of	Marshall	 plan	 aid.	During	 the	
last	weeks	of	the	election	campaign,	State	secretary	George	Marshall	made	it	
publicly	clear	that	ERP	aid	for	Italy	would	have	been	cancelled	if	the	Italian	
communist	 party	 (PCI,	 Partito	 Comunista	 Italiano)	 had	 won	 the	 election.	
Election	success	for	De	Gasperi,	on	one	side	represented	one	of	the	first	major	
achievements	of	US strategy of containment,	 on	 the	other	 it	 reassessed	DC	
dependence	from	United	States	 in	concurrence	with	weak	result	 for	 liberals	
and	social	democrats.	Substantial	differences	between	Rome	and	Washington	
policies	to	reach	economic	stabilization	would	emerge	soon	behind	common	
anti-communist	 commitment.	After	 18	April	 1948	 and	 in	 concurrence	with	
ERP	effective	start,	American	authorities	began	to	exert	stronger	and	stronger	
pressures	on	Italian	government	through	ambassador	Dunn	in	order	to	allow	the	
government	use	of	counterpart	funds	to	increase	productive	investments	and	
absorb	unemployment,	after	the	already	obtained	currency	stabilization.	Bank	
of	Italy	and	minister	of	Treasury	behaviour	however,	clung	to	reconstruction	
policies	of	budget	deficit	and	balance	of	payment,	contributing	in	this	vein	to	
keep	production	growth	slow	and	to	keep	manning	level	down	(Romero	1994:	
262).
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4. European Recovery Program (ERP) in Italy 
Recently,	 a	 periodization	 of	 ERP	 aid	 in	 Italy	 has	 been	 proposed	 consisting	
of	two	phases	which	followed	one	another	between	the	second	half	of	1949	
and	1950.	The	principal	difference	between	them	is	related	to	impact	of	aids	
on	 the	 economy	and	 to	ECA	pressures	 on	 Italian	government:	 a	first	 phase	
marked	 by	 substantial	 ineffectiveness	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 phase	 characterized	
by	 strong	 quantitative	 influence	 on	 public	 budget	 and	 by	 American	 staff	
pressures	 towards	 a	 Keynesian	 use	 of	 available	 funds.	 This	 chronological	
model	of	describing	ERP	is	confirmed	by	the	comparison	between	the	change	
in	 composition	 of	 imported	 goods,	 stockpiling	 of	 counterpart	 fund	 and	 its	
strategic	usage	decided	by	Italian	government.	Furthermore,	from	May	1949	
ECA	was	obliged	to	substantially	modify	delivery	procedures	because	of	delays	
and	ineffectiveness	in	their	absorption	by	involved	European	countries.	With	
regards	to	the	composition	of	imported	goods	in	Italy,	since	1950	prevalence	
was	evident	in	the	share	of	industrial	equipment	and	raw	materials	with	respect	
to	foodstuffs	that	composed	main	imported	goods	in	the	first	ERP	phase	(1948-
49)	(Spagnolo	2001:	133-136).
In	 the	 two-year	period	1948-50	ERP	aid	selling	by	Italian	administration	
did	not	substantially	influence	balance	of	payments	but	in	the	following	period	
things	were	different:	military	aids	overlapped	stockpiled	reserves	thus	making	
the	 counterpart	 fund	 contribute	 decisively	 in	 increasing	 the	 low	 income.	
Counterpart	fund	composed	around	16%	of	income	in	1950-51,	year	of	ERP	
highest	impact	on	Italian	balance,	while	remaining	higher	than	5%	until	ERP	
end	(Spagnolo	2001:	137-138,	146).
With	those	remarks,	we	turn	now	our	attention	to	the	analysis	of	economic	
policies	carried	out	by	centrist	governments	with	respect	to	ERP	aid.	The	strong	
connection	between	those	policies	and	domestic	task	of	political consolidation 
will	be	pointed	out.	As	we	have	already	stressed,	the	Italian	government	and	
the	Bank	of	Italy	pursued	economic	policies	devoted	to	recover	public	budget	
in	order	to	curb	inflation	and	reach	monetary	stability	even	after	the	18	April	
electoral	success	and	in	contrast	with	ECA	advice.	The	choice	of	squeezing	
public	expenditure	and	at	the	same	time	non-raising	tax	was	necessary	to	stabilize	
social	alliance	at	the	base	of	DC	government.	The	governments’	views	on	taxes	
were	explained	clearly	by	the	minister	of	Treasury	Giuseppe	Pella	on	March	
‘48,	during	a	conference	organized	by	 the	Confederation	of	 Italian	 Industry	
(Confindustria)	 titled	 “Italian	 industrial	 economy	and	European	cooperation	
programs	with	particular	regard	to	European	Recovery	Program”.	According	
to	 Pella,	 the	Marshall	 plan	 counterpart	 fund	 could	 feed	 public	 expenditure	
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without	 inflation	 as	 long	 as	 it	was	 addressed	 towards	growth	of	 production	
and	productivity	(Spagnolo	2001:	174-175).	In	this	context,	counterpart	fund	
function	was	 invaluable	 as	 they	 suffice,	 since	1950-51,	 to	 determine	public	
investment	policy	(Spagnolo	2001:	145-148).2	Among	the	American	initiatives	
in	the	ERP	context,	it	is	also	present	an	action	in	the	trade	union	field.	On	the	
level	of	propaganda,	the	American	trade	unionists	in	ECA	staff	succeeded	in	
transmitting	to	Italy	the	image	of	ERP	aid	as	a	promise	of	higher	welfare	and	
democracy	at	a	popular	level	and	in	legitimating	Marshall	plan	towards	public	
opinion	as	a	project	of	diffusion	of	a	newer	and	more	prosperous	way of life 
(Ellwood	1985).3
In	spite	of	this	success,	American	trade	unionists	failed	in	transmitting	their	
model	of	 settlement	of	 the	 social	 conflict	 to	 Italy.4	To	be	more	precise,	 this	
failure	was	double:	on	one	side,	Italian	choices	in	the	conduction	of	economy	
were	 different,	 as	 already	 stressed,	 from	 those	 desired	 by	 trade	 unionists	
supporting	the	New	Deal.	Italian	choices	remained	indeed	linked	and	rooted	
on	internal	national	dynamics.	On	the	other	side,	the	contractualistic	and	non-
political	model	 of	 industrial	 relations	 promoted	 by	 the	 ERP	 in	 Europe	 and	
in	which	 trade	unions	would	have	played	a	 leading	role	 in	 the	negotiations,	
never	took	place.	On	the	contrary,	Italian	unions	faced	a	long	period	of	decline	
distant	from	that	role	of	major	supporter	of	the	development	in	the	framework	
of	 neo-corporatism	 desired	 by	 new	 dealers	 unionists	 in	 the	 ECA	 (Romero	
1988:	367-369).	
The	need	for	a	boost	in	economy	was	moving	forward	little	by	little	inside	
government	 alliance	 and	 entrepreneurs	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 (December	
1948)	ECA	threatened	to	cut	aids	for	Italy	in	1948-49	from	$	601	million	to	
$	 583	million	 because	 of	 high	 increase	 in	 Italian	monetary	 reserves	 during	
2	 	According	 to	 Chiarella	 Esposito,	 Pella	 could	 follow	 undisturbed	 his	 policies	 of	 monetary	
stabilization	principally	 thanks	 to	 the	 internal	divisions	and	 the	chaotic	situation	 in	 the	various	
levels	of	ECA.	This	condition	was	provoked	by	 the	ECA	staff’s	 incapability	 to	understand	 the	
Italian	reality	in	which	it	was	necessary	to	gain	political	alliances	rather	than	to	rely	on	technical	
and	administrative	solutions	to	achieve	economic	development.	(Esposito	1994)
3	 	 The	 massive	 American	 propaganda	 operation	 in	 Italy	 began	 on	 summer	 1948	 with	 the	
Information	programme	of	the	ERP	led	by	its	Information	Division	headed	by	Andrew	Berding.	
Between	June	1948	and	the	end	of	1950,	$	537239.30	million	were	spent	to	fulfil	propagandistic	
aims,	the	most	withdrawn	from	counterpart	funds	of	ERP	aid.
4	 	 American	 trade	 unions	 participation	 to	 international	 political	 initiatives	 promoted	 by	 US	
administrations	in	 the	post-war	period	can	be	explained	considering	the	global	character	of	 the	
American	 intervention	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 reconstruction	 period.	 The	 America	 effort	 entwined	
economic,	political,	social	and	cultural	elements.	In	particular,	the	need	to	involve	unions	in	this	
global	effort	was	born	from	the	crucial	goal	of	defusing	the	social	conflict	thus	depriving	it	of	its	
class	aspect.	
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the	 last	 three	months	 of	 1948.	 The	 conflict	 between	 different	 development	
strategies	 for	 Italy	 conceived	 by	 centrist	 government	 and	 by	 ECA	 came	 to	
light	on	February	1949	with	the	presentation	to	American	Congress	of	the	ERP	
first-year	 report	 presented	 by	ECA	 president	 Paul	Hoffman.	The	 “Hoffman	
report”	contained	some	enclosed	studies	regarding	each	country	involved	in	
the	 plan,	 the	 so	 called Country studies.	Country	 study	on	 Italy	 expressed	 a	
severe	criticism	with	regard	to	national	development	programs	with	references	
to	long-term	plan,	the	afore-mentioned	“Saraceno	plan”:	excessive	monetary	
stockpiling,	 lack	 of	 an	 investment	 coordinated	 plan	 and	 appropriate	 use	 of	
State	intervention	to	fight	unemployment	and	a	strong	protectionism	(Spagnolo	
2001:	207,	217).
As	a	result	in	the	first	half	of	1949,	ECA	leadership	in	Washington	threatened	
an	$	85	million	cut	on	ERP	second	year	aid	(after	$	50	million	cuts	in	the	first	
year)	in	case	Italy	had	not	started	an	industrial	based	growth	plan	and,	to	show	
its	firm	stand,	ECA	interrupted	allocation	of	lira	funds	until	July	‘49.	
The	 dispute	 emerged	 with	 Country	 study	 between	 Italy	 and	 the	 United	
States	was	one	of	the	concurrent	factors	which	contributed	towards	a	change	
in	Italian	investment	policy.	The	most	recent	studies	have	defined	it	as	1949	
«small turning point».	The	next	section	 is	dedicated	 to	describe	 this	 further	
step	in	post	war	economic	reconstruction.	
5. The «small turning point», «third stage» and perspectives5
The	expression	«third stage»	points	out	 that	period	of	 economic	and	 social	
reforms	which	had	begun	with	the	«small turning point»	between	the	end	of	
1949	and	1950	and	is	so	called	because	it	followed	the	stages	of	reconstruction 
and	stabilization.	Recent	studies	agreed	in	outlining	some	innovative	features	
in	 economic	 policies	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	 period’s	 but	 they	 share	
complementary	traits	thus	not	allowing	speaking	of	a	clear	break.	The	tasks	of	
monetary	stabilization	and	of	the	rebuilding	of	gold	reserves,	fulfilled	within	
1949,	enabled	indeed	to	set	economic	policies	of	development	for	the	period	
1950-51,	represented	by	three	key	measures:	liberalization	of	the	trade,	revision	
of	the	protectionist	policies	in	favour	of	a	decrease	of	taxes	on	foreign	goods	
and	finally	industrialization	of	the	country	(Fauri	1998:	224-225).
In	order	 to	shed	 light	on	 this	point	 it	 is	useful	 to	 refer	 to	 that	 interpretation	
which	describes	 this	 change	as	a	«correction	of	conduct».	At	 the	beginning	
5	 	 In	 Italian	 historical	 literature	 «piccola	 svolta»	 and	 «terzo	 tempo»	 are	 the	 expressions	 here	
translated	with	«small	turning	point»	and	«third	stage».
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(Autumn	‘48)	this	«correction»	concerned	the	use	of	ERP	aid	to	buy	industrial	
equipment	and	later,	in	1950,	it	took	the	shape	of	a	boost	of	public	intervention	
in	economy	(Barca	1997:	31).	
This	boost	was	represented	by	the	decision	to	allocate	ERP	funds	in	such	
sectors	as	iron	and	steel	industry,	mechanical	engineering	industry,	car	industry,	
chemical	industry	and	in	programs	for	underdeveloped	areas	by	the	instrument	
of	Autonomous Public Boards. Southern Italy Development Fund	(Cassa	per	
il	Mezzogiorno,	Casmez)	was	created	 to	enable	 the	State	 to	 start	 a	 ten-year	
project	 for	 the	 development	 of	 Southern	 Italy	 (D’Antone	 1995:	 17-64).	 In	
1950,	distribution	of	counterpart	funds	was	addressed	to	industry	(28.1%)	and	
transports	(20.7%)	as	well	as	agriculture	(14.3%)	and	public	works	(25.1%)	
(Romero	1994:	264).	
Italian	 public	 expenditure	 strategy,	 far	 from	 following	 main	 Keynesian	
tasks	upheld	by	ECA	(aggregate	demand	support,	start	of	a	widespread	welfare	
system	and	above	all	growth	in	workers’	employment	and	wage	rates	to	defeat	
communist	 threat),	aimed	to	target	aids	to	heavy	industry	and	to	clientelism	
welfare	that	won	over	the	support	of	both	northern	entrepreneurs	and	southern	
notables.	The	 tasks	 that	ECA	expected	 the	 Italian	 government	 to	 undertake	
within	the	framework	of	the	so	called	Productivity Drive	were	only	fulfilled	
on	 a	 microeconomic	 level	 by	 acquiring	 new	 plants	 and	 machinery	 and	 by	
introducing	new	organizational	models.	The	sectors	 that	benefited	 from	this	
rationalization	 process	 through	 technological	 transfer	 were	 the	 mechanical	
engineering	 industries	 such	 as	 Fiat,	 Alfa	 Romeo,	 Lancia,	 Innocenti,	 and	
Piaggio.	These	latter	two	imported	by	the	ERP	complete	supplies	for	tracking,	
moulding,	assembling	and	welding	the	scooters	Lambretta	and	Vespa.	By	the	
ERP,	the	power	supply	industry	bought	facilities	for	drilling,	boring,	oil	cracking,	
methane	cracking	and	massification.	Moreover,	the	evident	technological	gap	
the	electricity	and	electro-mechanical	 industries	suffered	from	since	 the	end	
of	the	war,	was	caught	up	by	the	purchase	of	huge	American	turbo	generators	
(otherwise	 unavailable	 in	 Italy)	 and	 the	 consolidation	 of	 direct	 connection	
between	Ercole	Marelli	and	Westinghouse	(D’Attorre	1985a:	74-76).
The	 iron	 and	 steel	 industry	 benefited	 from	ERP	 aid	 in	 a	 crucial	way.	 In	
particular,	 it	 is	 enlightening	 to	 describe	 the	 troubled	 events	 related	 to	 both	
Cornigliano	plant,	near	Genoa,	and	ECA	administrations	behaviours	at	 their	
different	levels,	local	and	central.	Cornigliano	plant	received	for	its	building	
$	26.3	million	of	ERP	aid,	the	80%	of	the	overall	amount,	that	is	to	say	$	32	
million,	reserved	to	the	Finsider	group	(subset	of	the	state	agency	IRI	devoted	
to	the	steel	and	iron	control),	about	50%	of	the	whole	allocation	for	this	sector.	
It	may	be	stated	that	“[...]	the	Genoan	plant	dominated	the	scene	of	the	post-	
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war	steel	investment	[being	also]	one	of	the	major	industrial	undertakings	not	
only	in	Italy	but	in	the	whole	Europe”	(Ranieri	1996:	188).
Post-war	national	steel	and	iron	industry	followed	the	development	directives	
laid	down	by	the	«Sinigaglia	plan».	However,	the	plan	met	the	perplexity	and	
the	opposition	of	ECA	in	Washington	and	above	all	of	Langdon	Simons,	ECA	
iron	and	steel	section	chief.	Simons	deemed	indeed	excessive	the	Finsider	call	
for	funds	because	over	dimensioned	in	front	of	the	needs	and	the	capabilities	
of	an	industrial	sector	as	small	as	the	Italian	one.	Simons	could	count	on	the	
support	of	prominent	 subjects	 in	 the	private	 steel	 and	 iron	 industry	 such	as	
Falck.	
The	outbreak	of	the	Korean	war	seemed	to	be	a	turning	point	from	a	double	
perspective.	One	emphasizes	the	submittal	of	all	the	job	orders	for	industrial	
machinery	 apt	 for	 war	 to	 the	 authorization,	 beyond	 ECA-MSA	 (Economic	
Cooperation	Administration	–	Mutual	Security	Administration),	of	the	newly	
formed	National	Production	Authority,	slowing	down	the	delivery	times	and	
increasing	prices.	This	situation	provoked	 the	diplomatic	 intervention	of	De	
Gasperi	on	June	1951,	who	foreboded	serious	negative	consequences	on	the	
DC	government	 in	case	 the	Cornigliano	plant	would	not	 start	operating.	So	
most	of	the	supplies	was	delivered	within	the	end	of	1952.	The	other	perspective	
underlines	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 manufacturing	 capacity	 that	 Simons	 presumed	
excessive	in	the	Italian	estimate	was	dropped	by	ECA	in	Washington	since	the	
outbreak	of	the	Korean	war	because	“[...]	already	in	April	1950	Simons,	visiting	
the	plant,	wanted	to	be	reassured	about	Cornigliano	capacity	to	someday	reach	
the	production	 level	of	one	million	[tons	of	 raw	steel]”	(Ranieri	1996:	184-
185).
The	 so-called	 depressed	 areas	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 Mezzogiorno	 were	
important	 recipients	 of	 ERP	 aid	 as	 mentioned	 before	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
institution	of	 the	Cassa	per	 il	Mezzogiorno.	The	case	of	Sicily	shows	some	
central	 themes	 and	 behaviours	 adopted	 by	 ECA	 administration	 and	 by	 the	
Italian	government	at	both	central	 and	 local	 level.	The	 role	and	 importance	
of	the	announced	American	aid	to	Europe	were	mainly	interpreted	in	political	
rather	than	economic	perspective	in	Italy	until	the	key	election	of	April	1948.	
Sicily,	 although	with	 some	 disruptive	 elements	 of	 the	 social	 fabric	 such	 as	
mafia	and	brigandage,	was	animated	by	innovative	cultural	initiatives	aimed	
at	the	economic	and	civil	reprise	of	the	island	and	those	found	further	strength	
from	 the	 very	 announcement	 of	 a	 long-term	 plan	 of	 economic	 aid.	 During	
the	 two-year	 period	 1947-48,	 among	 the	 different	 positions	 and	 proposals	
regarding	 industrialization	 and	 reactivation	 of	 the	 pre-war	 manufacturing	
assets,	the	pragmatic	line	upheld	by	members	of	local	and	central	government	
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such	as	Scelba,	Ferrari	Aggradi,	and	De	Gasperi	himself,	prevailed.	This	line	
consisted	of	contingent	rather	than	long-term	planned	measures	(several	small	
credit	facilities	granted	very	slowly	and	with	discretionary	criteria),	such	as	the	
Togni	law	for	incentives	to	establish	manufacturing	plans	in	the	South	and	the	
Sicilian	regional	law	that	abolished	the	registration	of	securities	of	newly	set	
up	companies.	Moreover,	the	monetary	squeeze	dictated	by	the	Einaudi	line	
(preceding	 the	 two	 aforementioned	measures)	 strongly	 reduced	 their	 range.	
The	Einaudian	measures	penalized	much	more	the	South	than	the	North	of	the	
country	in	view	of	the	production	recovery	even	though	small	criticism	came	
from	 the	most	 influential	 economic	circles	 and	 from	 the	press	of	 the	 island	
because	these	measures	defended	savings	and	fixed	estate	incomes	(D’Attorre	
1986:	6-8).
The	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 Sicilian	 case	 lay	 in	 the	 massive	 action	 of	
propaganda	 and	 pressure	 on	 the	 Department	 of	 state	 exerted	 by	 the	 Italo-
American	Committee	that	was	born	on	1941	thanks	to	the	initiative	of	some	AFL	
(American	Federation	of	Labour)	members.	On	March	1948,	the	Committee	
sent	a	 report	 to	Washington	 in	which	 it	was	stressed	 the	central	position,	 in	
the	context	of	 the	“problema	Italia”,	of	 the	“questione	meridionale”	 in	anti-
communist	function.	In	this	vein	an	immediate	agrarian	reform	was	supported	
to	 stop	 communist	 progress	 in	 the	 Southern	 countryside.	 Substantially	 “the	
commitment	of	the	Committee	in	the	election	of	April	[1948]	cemented	a	stable	
link	between	Italo-American	circles	and	island	ruling	class	characterized	by	
the	well-known	illegal	aspects,	destined	to	go	on	during	the	whole	period	of	
the	Marshall	plan”(D’Attorre	1986:	9).
On	May	1948	the	Department	of	state	sent	to	Sicily	a	mission,	on	Italian	
plea,	whose	final	report,	marked	by	an	evident	New	Deal	spirit,	was	centred	
on	the	need	for	a	mainly	agricultural	development.	On	the	whole,	the	McCall-
Tomlinson	report	(by	the	names	of	the	two	mission	leaders)	overshadowed	the	
problem	of	 industrialization	 (with	 the	exception	of	 the	mining	 industry	 that	
attracted	American	interest	in	the	ERP	context),	overestimated	the	effectiveness	
of	„technical“	answers	 to	consolidated	economic	and	social	bottlenecks	and	
at	 the	same	 time	 it	 insisted	on	 the	 role	of	private	 initiative,	although	 it	was	
not	quite	sufficient	for	that	reality.	In	the	ECA	action	in	Italy	it	is	possible	to	
recognize	many	of	 those	goals,	even	though	they	did	not	find	approval	as	a	
whole	in	the	central	level	of	ECA	in	Washington	and	in	the	Department	of	state	
(while	anti-communism	steadily	remained	as	main	political	task)	(D’Attorre	
1986:	9-10).
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Between	1949	and	1950	ECA	administration	policies	in	Italy	underwent	a	radical	
change	in	which	the	Southern	“recipe”	based	on	the	centrality	of	the	agricultural	
development	was	replaced	by	a	strong	pressure	towards	industrialization.	In	
particular,	the	Korean	war	modified	the	international	situation	convincing	ECA	
of	the	need	to	directly	mobilize	American	private	capitals	towards	Italy.	In	this	
context,	Sicily	thanks	to	its	mineral	and	oil	resources	could	start	a	process	of	
industrialization.	The	Korean	juncture	drew	new	attention	for	the	United	States	
on	the	problem	of	strategic	raw	materials	and	Sicilian	sulphur	and	oil	attracted	
ECA	interest.	It	subsequently	endorsed	the	use	of	large	amounts	of	ERP	funds	
devoted	to	the	digging	out	of	sulphur.	ERP	funds	contributed,	for	what	regards	
oil,	to	the	fulfilment	of	its	exploitation	in	Sicily.	American	pressures	kept	pace	
with	it,	in	order	to	push	the	Italian	government	to	modify	the	law	of	1927	that	
regulate	the	exploitation	of	mineral	resources	so	as	to	reserve	a	more	favourable	
treatment	to	those	firms	engaged	in	the	drillings.	A	regional	Sicilian	law	that	
took	in	account	American	expectations	was	promulgated	on	March	1950	thus	
paving	 the	way	on	 the	 island	 to	multinational	corporation	such	as	Gulf	and	
Anglo	Iranian	(D’Attorre	1986:	24-32).
According	to	ECA	figures	Sicily	benefited	from	imports	on	grant	account	
principally	composed	by	wheat,	flour	and	penicillin	rather	than	raw	materials	
for	 industry,	while	 the	 loans	assigned	 to	Sicilian	 industries	amounted	 to	 the	
3.5%	of	the	available	allocation	with	a	clear	prevalence	for	electric	industries.	
Sicily	 received,	 for	what	 regards	 the	 lira	 fund,	 26.6	 billion	 liras,	 about	 4%	
of	 the	whole	counterpart	 fund,	an	amount	since	 then	 judged	 too	small	 for	a	
region	 that	 counted	 10%	of	 the	 overall	 Italian	 population.	The	 45%	of	 this	
figure	was	addressed	to	public	works,	private	building	and	reconstruction	of	
tourist	facilities.	The	assessment	of	the	ECA-MSA	activity	on	the	island	at	the	
conclusion	of	that	experience	was	substantially	negative	because	the	economic	
tasks	 set	 in	 advance	 were	 only	 marginally	 fulfilled,	 as	 the	 parliamentary	
inquiries	on	poverty,	unemployment	and	workers’	 living	standards	revealed.	
Nevertheless,	 a	 concrete	 achievement	 in	 anti-communist	 stance	 was	 found	
by	 social	 stabilization	 through	 charging	 entrenched	 local	 institutions	 of	 the	
management	 of	 the	 continuous	 flow	 of	American	 resources	 in	 the	 form	 of	
allocation	of	credits	and	of	distribution	of	goods.	In	this	same	vein,	the	case	of	
Federconsorzi	is	paradigmatic	because	this	network	of	agricultural	consortia,	
heritage	of	the	Fascist	period,	was	not	only	left	untouched	but	even	permitted	
to	freely	manage	both	the	allocation	of	cereals	to	Sicily	(out	of	any	democratic	
control)	and,	above	all,	of	American	grants	to	buy	machinery	for	agriculture	
(129	million	liras)	(D’Attorre	1986:	32-35).
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6. Conclusion 
In	this	final	section	I	will	try	to	propose	an	answer	to	the	main	question	that	
arises	among	leading	scholars	while	debating	about	the	relationship	between	
Italian	 reconstruction	process	and	 the	Marshall	plan:	was	 the	Marshall	plan	
necessary	for	industrial	and	economic	recovery	of	Italy?	I	take	my	cue	from	
the	answer	to	that	question	which,	in	the	post-war	period,	was	given	by	Luigi	
Einaudi,	liberal	economist	and	among	the	first	responsible	for	the	shaping	of	
Italian	economic	policy.	He	believed	(and	with	him	the	whole	Italian	liberal	
alignment)	 that	American	aids	were	not	necessary	 for	 Italy;	on	 the	contrary	
they	 introduced	 a	 bias	 in	market	 by	 continuing	 and	 even	 increasing	 dollar	
deficit	in	the	balance	of	payment	(Spagnolo	2001:	137-138).	
Einaudi’s	disagreement	was	provoked	first	of	all	by	ideological	factors	and	
it	did	not	take	into	account	Bretton	Woods	political	imperative	of	stabilization,	
the	need	to	manage	German	industrial	power	and	popular	pressure	for	wealth	
redistribution.	 The	 Marshall	 plan,	 while	 introducing	 a	 bias	 in	 market	 and	
balances	of	payment	of	involved	countries,	enabled	to	avoid	cut	in	consumption	
and	 to	 negotiate	 the	 paths	 of	 reconstruction.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 very	meaning	 that	
American	economic	backing	was	fundamental:	by	shielding	European	political	
systems	(the	Italian	one	in	the	first	place)	from	market	side	effects	avoiding	the	
instability	of	the	first	post	war	period	(Spagnolo	2001:	138-139).
On	 strictly	 macroeconomic	 level	 figures	 of	 ERP	 aid	 point	 out	 a	 not	
negligible	role	for	Italy:	in	the	period	1948-52	goods	and	services	for	around	
$	1.500	million	came	to	Italy,	equal	to	about	11%	of	the	whole	Marshall	plan	
–	important	figures	but	not	decisive.	 In	all	 the	involved	countries	(Germany	
as	well)	productive	reflation	had	already	started	before	ERP	aid	arrived.	The	
Marshall	plan	crucial	role	as	well	as	all	the	previous	aid	programs,	(UNRRA	and	
Interim	Aid)	was	to	be	found	on	the political level	rather	than	on	the	economic 
one.	In	Italy,	economic	reflation	had	already	begun	but	ERP	aid	guaranteed	a	
decisive	margin	to	centrist	governments.	A	margin	that	allowed	DC	to	avoid	
the	danger	of	a	radicalization	in	social	conflict	above	all	during	1948,	a	delicate	
period	of	political consolidation	(Romero	1994:	260).
American	 aids	 allowed	 involved	 countries	 to	 avoid	 cuts	 in	 consumption	
and	to	negotiate	the	process	of	reconstruction	and	Italian	government,	though	
developing	 orthodox	 and	 non-expansive	monetary	 policies,	 could	 stockpile	
precious	reserves	for	imports	above	all	during	1951-53	(Spagnolo	2001:	138).	
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Marshall	 plan	 anti-communist	 meaning	 in	 Italy	 was	 not	 unfolded	 through	
ECA	mission	 supported	 social	 philosophy	 devoted	 to	 combine	 growth	 and	
consumption,	productivity	and	working	class	integration	in	economic	welfare.	
It	 was	 rather	 unfolded	 through	 political	 and	 economic	 strengthening	 of	
anticommunist	social	alliance	under	Christian-democratic	leadership.	The	use	
of	«extraordinary»	means	of Autonomous Public Boards	aimed	to	allocate	ERP	
resources	either	towards	public	and	private	industrial	entities	enjoying	highest	
negotiating	power	(Fiat,	Finsider,	Edison)	or	 towards	underdeveloped	areas,	
first	 of	 all	 the	 South	 of	 Italy,	 the	 so	 called	Mezzogiorno,	 through	Southern 
Italy Development Fund	(Cassa	per	il	Mezzogiorno,	Casmez)	(Romero	1994:	
264-265).
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